Many in India think the bilateral relationship may get a boost with Trump in the White House.
When I visited India earlier in the year, the overwhelming sense of the Indian analysts I met with was that Donald Trump would return to the White House. Many, if not most, viewed such a prospect favorably.
U.S. voters have now elected Trump president again. Prime Minister Narendra Modi offered his “heartiest congratulations” to his “friend” Donald Trump. What does a second Trump term mean for India?
U.S.-India ties prospered under Trump
Indians are optimistic because U.S.-India ties flourished during Trump’s first presidency. Trump’s deep concerns about China’s security and economic threats matched well with growing Indian apprehensions.
Two India-China events bookended Trump’s earlier tenure. In the summer of 2017, India had a long standoff with China in the area of Doklam near the intersection of the Bhutanese, Chinese, and Indian borders. That standoff ended peacefully but Indian observers believed Chinese assertiveness near Doklam called into question the longstanding India-China effort to manage this disputed border diplomatically. These doubts came to fruition in 2020. That year, India and China experienced their first deadly clash since the 1970s in the Galwan valley of Ladakh.
U.S.-India defense and intelligence cooperation, which had long predated the Trump era, accelerated. India signed agreements on military communications interoperability and geospatial intelligence sharing that had languished for years. The Quad grouping experienced a resurgence as its four constituent countries – the United States, India, Japan, and Australia – found themselves in at least directional agreement about the dangers of China’s new assertiveness. India’s external affairs minister, S. Jaishankar, recently emphasized he was unworried about the prospects for the Quad since, in his words, “it was revived under a Trump presidency in 2017.”
India is well-positioned for Trump 2.0
India is less dependent on the United States for security than many other partners. While India’s leadership may share American worries about China and seek to cooperate to manage Beijing, India has a large military and its own nuclear arsenal. Moreover, India hosts no U.S. military bases, and does not accept meaningful amounts of U.S. military aid. India does not desire U.S. retrenchment and isolationism – but could handle the consequences better than many U.S. partners across Asia and Europe.
Unlike many in Europe, most Indians welcome the prospect of U.S.-Russia détente under Trump, even if that means cutting off aid to Ukraine. U.S.-Russia confrontation harms India’s interests, in part by encouraging China-Russia entente. Many in India further believe U.S. support for Ukraine has emboldened Kyiv – and that ending that support will hasten the end of what many Indians view as an unnecessary war.
Similarly, many Indians bristled at criticism by the Biden administration over human rights or religious freedom matters in India. These American concerns grew in part as a result of distinct but overlapping U.S. and Canadian allegations that Indian officials were involved in a targeted killing program directed in part at individuals of Indian origin now living in North America. Some Indians, for example, worried that a Kamala Harris administration would reinforce “Washington’s proclivity to turn into a pedantic headmaster and give lectures on ‘human rights abuses’ and ‘treatment of minorities.’”
Trump does not generate those same fears. As U.S. academic Šumit Ganguly wrote recently:
A Trump presidency … is unlikely to advocate for human rights in India under any circumstances. Instead, if the past is any indication, he will overlook this issue entirely.
That will come as welcome news in India – at least to Indians whose human rights or religious freedoms are not in jeopardy. In fact, Trump’s own recent recollections on Modi – “he is the nicest and a total killer,” the former and future president said – suggest he is unlikely to give the Indian prime minister great difficulty on any excesses Modi might undertake at home or abroad.
But dangers remain for U.S.-India ties
Trump has a few core beliefs on foreign policy, as my colleague Elizabeth N. Saunders has argued. But those beliefs don’t offer a clear roadmap for the situations a new Trump administration will likely have to navigate in South Asia. Can we expect more unexpected moves from Trump? Many Indians likely recall when Trump, to their surprise and to the surprise of the U.S. bureaucracy, had a good personal rapport with Imran Khan, Pakistan’s prime minister. Trump used his 2019 meeting with Khan to offer U.S. good offices to mediate the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan. India has long sought to avoid third-party intervention in the dispute. The proposal caused an uproar in the Indian parliament, though like many Trump-era storms it soon blew over.
One big danger involves trade and technology, an area where Trump has shown more ideological continuity. India needs access to global markets and U.S. technology to further its remarkable economic growth story. Trump was willing to spar publicly with Modi over trade in 2019. It’s quite possible India might be one of several countries to suffer if a new era of Trump protectionism emerges. India’s comparative weakness in manufacturing might prove a hidden bonus, however, since India’s relative strength in the software and business process outsourcing sectors might be less vulnerable to likely Trump tariffs. Additionally, to the extent that future Trump tariffs target China primarily (and not global trade broadly), India might be a beneficiary from any “friendshoring” that results.
Of course, India also needs access to U.S. technology, and enabling that access has been a prominent goal of the Biden White House. Will America under Trump be willing to share U.S. technology with foreign partners – or will each bilateral relationship hinge on Trump’s goal of extracting a better deal? That remains to be seen.
5 million Indian Americans live in the U.S.
Relatedly, the large Indian diaspora in the United States has helped provide ballast to the U.S.-India relationship. About 5 million Indian Americans live in the United States, and many maintain close work and family connections along with positive feelings toward India. Education and skilled work visas have long been a key immigration path for Indians seeking to live and work in the United States. But several Indian news outlets have already raised concerns that Trump will support Republicans’ promises to curtail the H-1B visa program, which lets U.S. companies bring in highly skilled employees from India and elsewhere.
India’s multi-decade pursuit of strategic autonomy has put it in a good position to handle a second Trump presidency. There could be a rapid ascent in bilateral relations. Or there could be a major trade spat and turbulence. Best to keep seat belts buckled.
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