Why is populist rhetoric so prevalent, and does it even matter?
From the Americas to Europe and beyond, populist parties and politicians have again been on the rise. But what is populism, exactly? And why do politicians embrace populism – is it electorally beneficial?
While some see populism as a defining feature of the modern political landscape, others argue that the term is overused or misleading. Since the resurgence of the Trump administration, for instance, pundits have debated whether this new “populist cure is worse than the elite disease.” Yet others question whether it is even meaningful to call the new Trump administration “populist.”
So what is populism, exactly?
Commentators have used the term “populism” to describe everything from bad-but-popular economic policies to anti-establishment politicians with high charisma. Yet not all popular proposals, forceful leaders, or elite criticisms are necessarily populist in the way that social scientists use the term.
Scholars across disciplines draw on political scientist Cas Mudde’s “thin ideology” or “ideational” definition, which sees populism as a particular set of ideas depicting politics as a moral conflict between “the good people” against “a corrupt elite” or various outgroups. This set of ideas, which can be used as a rhetorical style in any political campaign, focuses on three key features:
- People-centrism – The idea that political legitimacy derives exclusively from “the people,” a unified and inherently virtuous collective;
- Anti-pluralism – The rejection of multiple, equally legitimate perspectives in favor of a singular, homogenous “general will” that the populist leader claims to represent;
- Moralized anti-elitism – The portrayal of elites, and any groups associated with them, as corrupt and self-serving, positioning them in direct opposition to the morally pure people.
Not everything that’s popular is populism
Some measures that resonate with voters can be mistaken for populism, when they are simply popular rather than built on this moralized opposition to the establishment. For instance, higher taxes on the wealthy may or may not be couched in a worldview that condemns “the elite” as fundamentally corrupt. Similarly, hostile rhetoric against particular ethnic or racial outgroups does not necessarily invoke the moral dichotomy of a good, pure people versus a nefarious establishment.
To be sure, there are many variants of populism across countries and ideologies. But political scientists generally see the combination of people-centrism, anti-pluralism, and moralistic anti-elitism as the defining core of populism. Charismatic leadership is not required but often amplifies populism’s claims by presenting one politician as the sole authentic voice of “the people.”
Populism: left and right
Because populism has no clear policy orientation, populist movements can be associated with both the ideological left and right. In Latin America, leaders such as Hugo Chávez combined populist rhetoric with socialist-inspired policies, promising direct power to the impoverished people while vilifying “neoliberal elites” in business and politics. In parts of Europe, populist movements frequently attach to nationalist or anti-immigration stances. That’s the strategy of the right-wing Alternative for Germany (AfD) party, which has steadily gained seats in the Bundestag.
Although these examples of populism differ sharply on specific policies, they share the rhetorical structure of moral conflict, and claim “the people” are under siege by insiders who do not serve the common good. Even in the United States, populism appears in different forms at different times, from late 19th-century agrarian protest movements to more modern brands that pivot around suspicion of government bureaucracy or international institutions.
Similarly, the particular identity of the “good people” and the “corrupt elites” tends to change in different contexts. Since populism sees the divide between the people and the elites as a moral distinction, traditional elites can still claim to be “outsiders” that represent the vaguely defined good people and attack competing elite groups. Thus, populist leaders like Evo Morales in Bolivia or Rafael Correa in Ecuador can win presidential elections and become part of the establishment. But survey studies have found that their populist supporters still dissociate these leaders from the political establishment and perceive that “He’s not one of them!”
But is populist rhetoric effective?
Observers note that anti-elitist claims resonate best when they reinforce deeper fears or frustrations about unaccountable government. Politicians who lean on this type of messaging typically do so in ways that amplify existing political or societal divides. Populism’s simplicity, in this sense, can be a strategic asset. The goal is to offer frustrated citizens a clean narrative of who is at fault – and why a bold outsider can set things right.
But recent research indicates that populist rhetoric alone might not be as electorally decisive as we might think. Several studies using experimental methods find that when voters assess hypothetical candidates – who vary by both policy stance and rhetorical style – they tend to weigh tangible policy positions more heavily than moralistic us-versus-them language.
Nonetheless, a populist campaign may help energize parts of the electorate who already distrust the political establishment. By promising to sweep out an unresponsive ruling class, candidates might capture protest votes, particularly when economic or cultural grievances are running high.
What populists get right – and why it still matters
Even critics of populism concede that many voters are legitimately disenchanted with established institutions. Populists often highlight genuine problems such as pervasive corruption, policy stagnation, or mismanaged immigration policies. And scholars indeed find that when in opposition, populism may have a positive effect on the quality of democracy. Populism can also mobilize previously disengaged citizens and integrate underrepresented groups into political life.
At the same time, modern-day populism thrives on economic anxieties tied to globalization, automation, and inequality, as well as cultural shifts related to migration and national identity. Populist leaders promise swift corrective measures, such as selective welfare expansions, trade protections, or the removal of entrenched officials. These actions may produce symbolic victories or short-term political gains, but rarely offer lasting solutions.
Once in power, populist leaders often concentrate authority, erode institutional independence, and weaken democratic checks. Latin America and Europe provide several examples of leaders who entered office railing against elites, only to later constrain judicial review, undermine press freedoms, or expand executive power.
While populists can expose real elite failures, they also risk reducing politics to a binary moral confrontation. By portraying opponents as evil rather than legitimate rivals, they entrench polarization and make compromise more difficult. When populist leaders remain in perpetual campaign mode – rallying supporters against “the establishment” rather than advancing substantive policy solutions – this can paralyze governance. Though this approach may feel empowering for disillusioned voters, this can result in limited paths toward consensus-based policymaking.
As a result, the initial popularity of populist leaders tends to fade thermostatically. When promises and quick fixes fail to materialize and institutional checks deteriorate, voters shift their allegiance, and look elsewhere for solutions.
Related Good Authority posts:
- Alexander Kustov, “Germany’s far-right party made huge gains in the 2025 elections.” From Feb. 26, 2025, when the AfD became the second-largest party in the Bundestag.
- Alexander Kustov, “Good to Know: Public backlash.” From May 6, 2024, discussing the impact of strong public reaction to people, political decisions, and more.
- Pippa Norris, “So is the wave of populist nationalism finished? Hardly.” From May 2017, exploring whether European support for populists has peaked – or is it still rising?
- Pippa Norris, It’s not just Trump. Authoritarian populism is rising across the West. Here’s why. From 2016, providing a closer look at the deep cultural backlash fueling autocracies.
- John Sides, “Are we exaggerating populism’s threat to democracy?” From September 2024, a review of Democracy’s Resilience to Populism’s Threat, by political scientist Kurt Weyland.
- John Sides, “Right-wing populist parties have risen. Populism hasn’t.” From January 2024, discussing a new angle on populism by Oren Danieli, Noam Gidron, Shinnosuke Kikuchi, and Ro’ee Levy.
- Joseph Wright, Erica Frantz, and Andrea Kendall-Taylor, “In El Salvador and elsewhere, leaders find ways to break term limits.” From October 2022, discussing new research on why personalist party leaders are more likely to try to expand executive power.
- Michael Tesler, “Why the blame game finally turned on Trump.” From March 2025, explaining public backlash on the economy, and presidential approval ratings.
Further reading and resources:
- Bart Bonikowski and Noam Gidron, “The Populist Style in American Politics: Presidential Campaign Discourse, 1952–1996,” Social Forces, 2016, vol. 94, no. 4, pp. 1593-1621.
- Yaoyao Dai and Alexander Kustov, “When Do Politicians Use Populist Rhetoric? Populism as a Campaign Gamble,” Political Communication, 2022, vol. 39, no. 3, pp. 383-404.
- Yaoyao Dai and Alexander Kustov, “The (In)Effectiveness of Populist Rhetoric: A Conjoint Experiment of Campaign Messaging,” Political Science Research and Methods, 2024, vol. 12, no. 4, pp. 849-856.
- Yaoyao Dai, “Don’t Exaggerate the Importance of Populism,” The Loop, 2024.
- Sergei Guriev, “Causes and Consequences of Spreading Populism: How to Deal with This Challenge,” EconPol Forum, 2024, vol. 25, no. 2.
- Robert A. Huber and Christian H. Schimpf, “Friend or foe? Testing the influence of populism on democratic quality in Latin America,” Political Studies, 64, no. 4 (2016): pp. 872-889.
- Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, “The ambivalence of populism: threat and corrective for democracy,” Democratization 19, no. 2 (2012): pp. 184-208.
- Alexander Kustov and Yaoyao Dai, “60 Years of Campaign Speeches Reveal Why We’ll Hear More Divisive Rhetoric in 2024,” 3Streams, July 9, 2023.
- Cas Mudde, The Populist Radical Right: A Reader (Taylor & Francis, 2016).
- Timothy J. Ryan, “No compromise: Political consequences of moralized attitudes,” American Journal of Political Science, 61, no. 2 (2017): pp. 409-423.
- Bruno Castanho Silva, Fabian Guy Neuner, and Christopher Wratil, “Populism and Candidate Support in the US: The Effects of ‘Thin’ and ‘Host’ Ideology,” Journal of Experimental Political Science, 2023, vol. 10, no. 3, pp. 438-447.
- Bruno Castanho Silva, “‘He’s not one of them!’ Antiestablishment supporters of populist governments in Bolivia and Ecuador,” The Journal of Politics, 81, no. 3 (2019): pp. 1085-1089.
- Kurt Weyland, Democracy’s Resilience to Populism’s Threat: Countering Global Alarmism (Cambridge University Press, 2024).
Alex Kustov is a 2024-2025 Good Authority fellow.
Yaoyao Dai is an assistant professor at the University of North Carolina at Charlotte.
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